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International cooperation through multilateral and bilateral agreements is a
pillar of space diplomacy and has been since humankind first ventured toward
the stars. Space is inherently an international consideration for every nation and
comes with added anxieties, like challenging dual-technologies or the potential
to encourage arms escalation. The United States (“U.S.”) is a major space power
and global leader in space.1 The decisions made by the U.S. not only draw the
attention of our adversaries but may bolster or complicate those with our allies.2
In 2020, the U.S. began a push for a series of bilateral agreements, called the
Artemis Accords.3 These agreements underscore existing multilateral
agreements, while also reinforcing U.S. interpretation of international law.4 This
turned into bilateral agreements, shadowing existing multilateral agreements,
garnering international attention. Without a doubt, the Artemis Accords will
alter international relationships in space, but the question is, how?

Defense Space Summary Strategy, DEP’T OF DEF. 1 (June 2020), https://media.defense.
gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF.
2
Erik Lin-Greenberg, Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and
Decision-Making, 3 TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV. 56, 61 (2020).
3
Elle Rothermich, NASA’s Artemis Accords Boost Commercial Space Activity, REGUL.
REV. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/12/23/rothermich-nasa-artemisaccords-boost-commercial-space-activity/.
4
Id.
1
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I. THE U.S. SPACE LANDSCAPE: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE
ARTEMIS ACCORDS
The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Act (“Space Act”), passed by
Congress in 1958, created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(“NASA”) to conduct the nation’s civil space program and grant authority to the
Department of Defense for space activities relating to defense and security. 5
Since, NASA has been a globally celebrated agency dedicated to science and
technology related to air and space.6 The agency, spread over nine centers,
enjoys a reputation of scientific excellence and achievements in space
exploration. In fact, the past several years have seen major movement in space
interest, both in the commercial and civil arena and the security and military
domain.7 This introduction seeks to “set the stage” for discussion of the Artemis
Accords by briefly covering the current status of space policy and politics in the
U.S.8
NASA is not well known as a regulatory administration and is fundamentally
tasked with scientific endeavors.9 Section 102(c) of the Space Act charges
NASA with objectives such as, “improvement of the usefulness, performance,
speed, safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles” and the
“expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space.”10
However, in subsection 7, NASA is also tasked with a decidedly more
diplomatic task, “[c]ooperation by the U.S. with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the
results thereof.”11 This provision, working with several others, charges NASA
with the important task of coordinating and cooperating with the world, always
with peace in mind.12 Like other administrations, NASA has an Office of
General Counsel, including an International Law Practice Group (“ILPG”). This
group is responsible for,
[P]roviding legal advice and counsel regarding international matters
at Headquarters and all NASA Centers. Some of the legal issues for

5
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 87-26, §201, 75 Stat. 47
(repealed 2010).
6
What Is NASA?, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/58/features/nasa-knows/what-is-nasa-58.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2021).
7
Majority of Americans Believe It Is Essential That the U.S. Remain a Global Leader
in Space, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 6, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/
2018/06/06/majority-of-americans-believe-it-is-essential-thatthe-u-s-remain-a-global-leader-in-space/.
8
Infra Part III.
9
What Is NASA?, supra note 6.
10 §102, 75 Stat. at 427.
11 Id.
12 See generally §102, 72 Stat. at 426.
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which ILPG is responsible include: international law, including
space law; domestic law which may impact NASA’s international
cooperation; issues involving the United Nations or other multilateral
organizations; international trade; telecommunications and use of the
radiofrequency
spectrum;
international
aspects
of
commercialization; export control; and national security. ILPG
advises on negotiating, drafting, executing, and interpreting
agreements, understandings, treaties and exchanges with all types of
foreign entities (both commercial and governmental), including
international organizations.13
In line with these objectives, NASA may enter into bilateral agreements, such
as the Artemis Accords.14 Bilateral agreements between NASA and other space
programs are not entirely unheard of—for example in 1998 NASA executed a
series of memorandums of understanding with the Canadian, European, Russian,
and Japanese space agencies, in addition to a larger multilateral agreement
regarding the International Space Station.15
Recalling that the Space Act delegated space security to the Department of
Defense, the U.S. Air Force has also been active in the space domain since
1982.16 Albeit that existing presence, former President Donald Trump’s
announcement of his desire to create a “U.S. Space Force” caused a stir
internationally.17 However, the notion of such an organization was not entirely
unheard of when the President surprised the nation and the world with his
announcement in 2018.18 While the politics continued to unfold, Trump reactivated USSPACECOM, which did not require the same congressional
authorization as the creation of a new branch does. 19 Eventually, the Department
13 International Law, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/international/index.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
14 Nick Perry, New Zealand Latest Country to Sign Space Agreement with NASA, N.Z.
HERALD (June 1, 2021), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-zealand-latest-country-to-signspace-agreement-withnasa/CI75L43FQOSV46FRZQEACZJE3Q/.
15 International Law Resources, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/international/
Intnl_subst_areas_text.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
16 Namrata Goswami, The US ‘Space Force’ and Its Implications, DIPLOMAT (June 22,
2018), https://thediplomat.
com/2018/06/the-us-space-force-and-its-implications/.
17 See generally Reality Check Team, Russian President Warns over Expansion of US
Space Force, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada45171311.
18 Marcia Smith, Top Air Force Officials Punt on Trump’s “Space Force”,
SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM (Mar. 14, 2018), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/top-airforce-officials-punt-on-trumps-space-force/.
19 Marcia Smith, Military/National Security Space Activities, SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM,
https://spacepolicyonline.
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of Defense and the Trump administration decided to forego the concept of the
Space Force as a new military branch and proposed that it be a sixth military
service under the Air Force.20
The Trump administration also reestablished the National Space Council and
has made several agency changes aimed at streamlining the regulatory hurdles
space companies face.21 The Trump administration, while largely leaving the
Obama and Bush era policies in place, also produced a flurry of executive orders
in its last year, aimed at everything from promoting nuclear power and
propulsion, planetary protection, and most notably to this topic: space
resources.22
This brief overview of U.S. space development is meant to show that outer
space and its international nature are in the public spotlight. Global leaders have
a major impact on how the world sees space. From calls for a “global commons”
to a President who wanted to create a military branch (incidentally inspiring a
sitcom23), space policy plays an integral role in international relationships.24
II. OVERVIEW AND INTENT OF THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS
The purpose of the Artemis Accords is the advancement of humankind in
space and the advancement of international collaboration in space.25 They also
affirm the importance of complying with existing international agreements,
especially the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, more commonly known as the “Outer Space Treaty.”26 In fact, many
sections of the Accords call back to either the Outer Space Treaty or other

com/topics/militarynational-security-space-activities/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
20 Id.
21 President Re-Establishes National Space Council, OFF. OF SPACE COM. (July 3,
2017), https://www.space.commerce.gov/president-re-establishes-national-space-council/.
22 Military/National Security Space Activities, supra note 19.
23 SPACE FORCE (Netflix 2020).
24 See generally Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the
Global Partnership for Development Beyond 2015, UN 5 (Jan. 2013),
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/
thinkpieces/24_thinkpiece_global_governance.pdf (“International law identifies four global
commons, namely the High Seas, the Atmosphere, the Antarctica and the Outer Space.”);
Dr. Cassandra Steer, Why Outer Space Matters for National and International Security,
CTR. FOR ETHICS & RULE OF L. UNI. OF PA., 1, 2 (Jan. 2020).
25 The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of
the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes, § 1, Oct. 13, 2020,
NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed13Oct2020.pdf [hereinafter Artemis Accords].
26 See generally id.
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notable multilateral agreements.27 There is a clear notion of using a series of
bilateral agreements to potentially bolster multilaterals ones, while also perhaps
attempting to set some norms of behavior.28
The core substance of the Accords is in Sections 3 to 12. Section 3, “Peaceful
Purposes,” states that the Accords’ signatories affirm that cooperative activities
under the Accords will be only for peaceful purposes.29 This section also states
that these cooperative activities are to be carried out in accordance with “relevant
international law,” like the Outer Space Treaty.30 In Section 4, “Transparency,”
the signatories commit to transparency about their national space policies and
space exploration plans.31 The Accords also commit to some sharing of
scientific information they get from their activities—this sharing will be
consistent with Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty, meaning the signatories
will also inform the United Nations’ Secretary-General.32 The Secretary-General
will be prepared to disseminate the information immediately and effectively.33
In Section 5, “Interoperability,” the signatories agree to utilize the current
interoperability standards for space-based infrastructure, to establish standards
when there are none or are inadequate ones, and to follow the standards that are
set.34 This ensures that the technology that the signatories’ agencies are
developing and using will be compatible with each other, making cooperation
easier.35 Section 6, “Emergency Assistance,” notes that the signatories will
rescue personnel in outer space who are in distress, acknowledging obligations
under the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue and Return
Agreement”).36
In Section 7, “Registration of Space Objects,” signatories commit to
registering any relevant space objects in accordance with the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration
Convention”) and consulting with non-signatories on what they should register

See generally id.
See generally id.
29 Id. at § 3.
30 Id.
31 Id. at § 4.
32 Id. at § 8, ¶ 2.
33 Id. at § 10, ¶ 3.
34 Id. at § 5.
35 Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Artemis Accords: A Step Toward International
Cooperation or Further Competition?, LAWFARE (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/artemis-accords-step-toward-international-cooperation-orfurther-competition.
36 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 6.
27
28
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and how they should do it.37 Section 8, “Release of Scientific Data,” is similar
to Section 4.38 In this section, the signatories reaffirm their commitment to the
open and timely sharing of scientific information.39 This section allows the
signatories to “retain the right to communicate and release information to the
public regarding their own activities.”40 They will coordinate with each other in
advance regarding the release of information that involves other signatories.41
Section 10, “Space Resources,” starts by saying “that the utilization of space
resources can benefit humankind.”42 “The extraction and utilization of space
resources . . . should be executed . . . [to] compl[y] with the Outer Space Treaty
and . . . support . . . safe and sustainable space activities.”43 The signatories will
inform the international community of their space resource extraction
activities.44 The signatories will also contribute to efforts to further develop
international practices and rules on the extraction and utilization of space
resources.45 This is the most controversial section of the Accords and is
discussed in greater detail later in this paper.46
In Section 11, “Deconfliction of Space Activities,” the signatories affirm that
the exploration and use of outer space should be done with “consideration to the
United Nations Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space
Activities adopted by the [United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of
Outer Space (“COPUOS”)] . . . in 2019.”47 However, there will be “appropriate
changes to reflect the nature of the operations beyond low-Earth orbit”
(“LEO”).48 Section 11 also sets up the use of “safety zones,” which are
temporary areas in space that signatories can carve out in order to safely conduct
their operations without unintentionally causing damage to other signatories’
equipment.49
Section 12, “Orbital Debris,” addresses the issue of space junk sitting in
LEO.50 The signatories will deal with the orbital debris from their missions
Id. at § 7.
Id. at § 8.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at § 10.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Andrew Brooks, The Artemis Accords: The Necessary Incentive of Space Extraction
Rights, COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.jtl.columbia.
edu/bulletin-blog/the-artemis-accords-the-necessary-incentive-of-space-extraction-rights.
See infra Parts VI–VII.
47 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 11.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at § 12.
37
38
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safely, timely, and efficiently.51 The signatories will, “to the extent practicable,
[try to limit] the generation of new, long-lived harmful debris released through
normal operations, break-up . . . and accidents and conjunctions by taking
appropriate measures.”52
A. Intent and General International Reaction
Notwithstanding the drafter’s collaborative intentions, the Artemis Accords
are not without controversy. China and Russia have not signed the Accords.
Russia thinks they are too “U.S.-centric,”53 and NASA is not allowed to work
with China under the Wolf Amendment.54 Some space and international law
experts are concerned that because China and Russia are not a part of the
agreement, the Accords will contribute to the escalation of competition and
rivalry in space between the U.S. and its allies and China and Russia and their
allies.55
Further, legal experts and countries are worried that the “safety zones” as
defined in Section 11 of the Accords could turn into “de facto spheres of
influence . . . or be subject to national appropriation,” and begin a wave of space
settlement.56 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty also bans this.57 Joanne
Gabrynowicz, editor-in-chief emerita of the Journal of Space Law, commented
on the legality of the “safety zones,” noting that “an international agreement
must come before staking out ‘some kind of exclusive area for science or for
whatever reason. It is not anything any nation can do unilaterally and still have
it be legal.’”58
Id.
Id.
53 Jonathan Amos, Project Artemis: UK Signs up to Nasa’s Moon Exploration
Principles, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/scienceenvironment-54530361?xtor=AL-72-%5Bpartner%5D-%5Bmicrosoft%5D-%5Blink%5D%5Bnews%5D-%5Bbizdev%5D-%5Bisapi%5D.
54 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
112-10, § 1340(a), 125 Stat.
38, 123 (2011).
55 Ortega, supra note 35; Guoyu Wang, NASA’s Artemis Accords: The Path to a United
Space Law or a Divided One?, SPACE REV. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.thespacereview.
com/article/4009/1.
56 Ortega, supra note 35.
57 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
58 Joey Roulette, Exclusive: Trump Administration Drafting ‘Artemis Accords’ Pact for
Moon Mining-Sources, REUTERS (May 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spaceexploration-moon-mining-exclusi/exclusive-trump-administration-drafting-artemis-accordspact-for-moon-mining-sources-idUSKBN22H2SB.
51
52
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There is also concern that there was not enough international collaboration on
the Accords. The Accords were written outside of the United Nations and over
a dozen countries have signed them as of October 2021.59 For a country to
become a signatory, it must sign a bilateral agreement with the U.S., whereas
historically most international law on space is created through large multilateral
agreements.60 The Accords do have a provision in Section 13 that provides that
the signatories will periodically come together to discuss what is in the Accords,
allowing the opportunity for more earnest international collaboration.61 Though,
in order for a country to have a say, they have to be a signatory, which means
they have to go through the U.S.. With Russia hesitant to join, and China being
barred from NASA collaboration, two big players on the space stage cannot be
included in these discussions and partnerships which may cause wariness from
other countries.
Despite the potential issues, the signatories are optimistic and proud of the
Artemis Accords. Former NASA administrator, Jim Bridenstine, has stated that
the Accords are a united, global coalition to explore space and establish “vital
principles that will create a safe, peaceful, and prosperous future in space.”62
According to the NASA acting associate administrator charged with beginning
the process, Mike Gold, the Accords will help avoid conflict, preserve peace,
strengthen mutual understanding, and reduce misperceptions.63 The Department
of State (under the previous administration) has placed importance on U.S.
leadership in space, especially regarding “purs[u]ing and maintaining a rulesbased international framework” for civilian space activities.64
Along with the U.S., officials or government agencies of the other Signatories
have expressed their eagerness to and their collective interest in exploring
space.65 In addition to the U.S., Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and
59 Brian Dunbar, Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future, NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/
specials/artemis-accords/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2022).
60 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 13; Space Law Treaties and Principles, U.N.
OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2022)
(giving an overview of the UN Committee’s five large international treaties).
61 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 13.
62 Sean Potter & Cheryl Warner, NASA, International Partners Advance Cooperation
with First Signings of Artemis Accords, NASA (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/pressrelease/nasa-international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-first-signings-of-artemisaccords.
63 Id.
64 Carolyn Pace, Space Exploration and the Artemis Accords, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/dipnote-u-s-department-of-state-officialblog/space-exploration-and-the-artemis-accords/index.html.
65 U.K., POLICY PAPER: NATIONAL SPACE STRATEGY, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/national-space-strategy/national-space-strategy (last updated Feb.
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the United Kingdom (U.K.) have brought attention to the fact that the Accords
are an international agreement.66 Like the U.S., Canada, Italy, Japan, the U.A.E.,
and the U.K. have said the Accords are to establish “principles to create a safe,
peaceful, and prosperous future in space.”67
III. SELECTED INDIVIDUAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
As of June 2021, 12 countries have signed the Artemis Accords: Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea,
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the U.S.68
Aforementioned, the general international response to the Artemis Accords has
been mixed.69 Government officials of the signatories are mainly optimistic and
excited for this new chapter of space relations.70 The non-government reports on
1, 2022); NASA Administrator Signs Declaration of Intent with Italy on Artemis
Cooperation, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-administrator-signs-declaration-ofintent-with-italy-on-artemis-cooperation (last updated Oct. 14, 2020).
66 Doug Messier, Ukraine Becomes the 9th Nation to Sign Artemis Accords,
PARABOLIC ARC (Nov. 14, 2020), http://www.parabolicarc.com/2020/11/14/ukrainebecomes-9th-nation-to-sign-artemis-accords/; UAE Among Eight Countries in NASA
‘Artemis Accords’ Space Coalition, ARAB NEWS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.arabnews.
com/node/1748496/lifestyle [hereinafter ARAB NEWS]; Tom Whipple, Britain’s Space
Agency Joins Nasa-Led International Group to Sign Moon Accords, TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-s-space-agency-joins-nasa-led-internationalgroup-to-sign-moon-accords-6hqm60wpx.
67 International Partners Advance Cooperation with First Signings of the Artemis
Accords, AGENZIA SPAZIALE ITALIANA (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.asi.it/en/2020/10/international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-firstsignings-of-the-artemis-accords/; Consulting Canadians on a Framework for Future Space
Exploration Activities, CANADA.CA, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moonexploration/consulting-canadians-framework-future-space-exploration-activities.asp (last
updated July 30, 2021); Eight Nations Sign Artemis Accords on Space Exploration,
MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCI. AND TECH. (Oct. 14, 2020), www.mext.go.jp/en/
news/topics/detail/mext_00032.html; UAE Space Agency Signs Artemis Accords for
International Space Cooperation, GULF NEWS (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-space-agency-signs-artemisaccords-for-international-space-cooperation-1.1602610338825 [hereinafter GULF NEWS];
Press Release, UK and NASA Sign International Agreement Ahead of Mission to the Moon,
GOV.UK (Oct. 13, 2020), https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-nasa-sign-international-agreement-ahead-ofmission-to-the-moon.
68 Chris Ciaccia, Brazil Has Signed the Artemis Accords to Promise its Space
Exploration Will be Peaceful and Green, Becoming the First South American Country to Do
So, DAILYMAIL.COM (June 16, 2021), https://www.
dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-9692699/Brazil-signed-Artemis-accords-SouthAmerican-country-so.html.
69 See supra Section III.a.
70 A Framework for Future Space Exploration Activities - Background Information,
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the Accords of the Signatories have been mainly positive but cautious.71 Nonsignatories have expressed concern and seem to be wary of the Accords.72 This
section outlines, a selection of individual responses from allied nations and
adversaries to the U.S..73
A. Australia
The response from the Australian Space Agency has been positive. Dr. Megan
Clark, head of the Australian Space Agency, has highlighted that the Accords
are for peaceful purposes.74 Ms. Clark noted “[it is] through the principles of the
Artemis Accords, that we share a collective interest in the exploration of outer
space for peaceful purposes.”75 On the surface, the Australian public seems to
be as content with the Accords similar to their space agency.76 Some Australian
companies are hoping to contribute to missions under the Accords and how
different industries are interested in space.77 However, some policy experts and
scientists tried to stop the Australian government from signing the Accords.78
They argued that humans should treat the Moon and space akin to the treatment
of Antarctica is treated and protected from mining and exploitation.79
CAN. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moonexploration/framework-future-space-exploration-activitiesbackground-info.asp (last updated Oct. 26, 2020).
71 See generally The Canadian Press, Canada Joins U.S.-Led Artemis Accords to Send
Human Explorers Back to Moon and Beyond, CANADIAN BROAD. CORP. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/artemis-accords-1.5761456; see generally Maya Yarova,
Ukraine Becomes the Ninth Country Joining the NASA Space Program, AIN.UA (Nov. 16,
2020), https://ain.ua/en/2020/11/16/ukraine-signs-the-nasa-artemis-accords/; Beatriz
Cavalcante, Brazil Signs with NASA to Take the First Black Woman and Man to the Moon,
O POVO (June 15, 2021), https://
www.opovo.com.br/noticias/economia/2021/06/15/brasil-assina-com-nasa-para-levarhomem-e-mulher-negros-a-lua.html.
72 Paul Stimers and Audrey Jammes, The Artemis Accords After One Year of
International Progress, SPACE REV. (Oct. 18, 2021),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4267/1.
73 See infra Sections IV.a–IV.i.
74 Press Release, Dep’t of Indus., Sci., Energy and Res., Australia Signs NASA’s
Artemis Accords (Oct. 14, 2020) (Austl.).
75 Id.
76 Public Views About Science in Australia, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/fact-sheet/public-views-about-science-in-australia/.
77 Tory Shepherd, Australia Signs International Space Agreement – Artemis Accords,
SPACE AUSTL. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://spaceaustralia.com/news/australia-signs-internationalspace-agreement-artemis-accords.
78 Anthony Galloway, Pyne Joins Global Push to Save Outer Space from Exploitation,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/pynejoins-global-push-to-save-outer-space-fromexploitation-20200907-p55t5k.html.
79 Id.
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B. Canada
The Canadian Space Agency has also been optimistic about the Accords. The
Canadian Space Agency President, Lisa Campbell, commented that
sustainability is a crucial concept in the Accords.80 The Canadian Space Agency
noted,”[t]he Accords are an important achievement for safe and sustainable
space exploration.”81 The public response in Canada was similar to that of
Australia’s response.82 Primary news sources reported on the Accords neutrally
but in a positive light.83 Major national newspaper, The Star, reported that China
and Russia are not signatories.84 Also, like Australia, there was some concern
from policy experts. David Kendall, former Director General of Space and
Science and Technology at the Canadian Space Agency and former Chairman
of COPUOS, expressed disappointment the Accords are not synched with
COPUOS.85 He also expressed his disappointment in Canada for choosing a
bilateral agreement with the U.S. instead of working for a multilateral agreement
through COPUOS.86 The Canadian Space Agency President Lisa Campbell also
expressed mixed feelings about the Accords: “[she] cheers the [A]ccords, but
says more robust rules for the exploration of deep space are still a long ways
off.”87
C. Italy
Like its Canadian counterpart, the Italian space agency, Agenzia Spaziale
Italiana, has also commented on the importance of sustainability in the
Accords.88 “[The Accords] will allow us and future generations a peaceful, safe
80 Canada Joins U.S.-led Artemis Accords to Send Human Explorers Back to Moon and
Beyond, supra note 71.
81 A Framework for Future Space Exploration Activities - Background Information,
supra note 70.
82 Public Views About Science in Canada, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/fact-sheet/public-views-about-science-in-canada/.
83 Canada Joins U.S.-led Artemis Accords to Send Human Explorers Back to Moon and
Beyond, supra note 71; Marcia Dunn, NASA’s New Moonshot Rules: No Fighting or
Littering, Please, AP NEWS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://
www.thestar.com/news/world/us/2020/10/13/nasas-new-moonshot-rules-no-fighting-orlittering-please.html.
84 Dunn, supra note 83.
85 Artemis Accords – Considerations for Canada, SPACEQ (June 10, 2020),
https://spaceq.ca/artemis-accords-considerations-for-canada/.
86 Id.
87 Canada Joins U.S.-led Artemis Accords to Send Human Explorers Back to Moon and
Beyond, supra note 71.
88 Italy-USA Agreement on the Exploration of the Moon, AGENZIA NAZIONALE STAMPA
ASSOCIATA (Sept. 25, 2020),
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and sustainable exploration of space to improve life on Earth,” said the
Undersecretary of State at the Presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers,
Riccardo Fraccaro.89 The Italian public seems to have the same response. News
sources have commented on how the Accords and the Artemis Program will
boost the Italian economy.90 In addition, Italian officials celebrated their
historical ties to, and continued partnership with, the U.S. on space issues.91
News sources have voiced concern over the potential of a new space race
between China and the U.S. that could turn dangerous, but the general attitude
has been optimistic.92
D. Japan
The Japanese government is also positive about the Accords and commented
on the Accords’ role in space exploration. “The Artemis Accords are a vital
commitment towards implementing safe and sustainable space exploration,”
said Hagiuda Koichi, Japan’s former minister of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology.93 The Japanese public has been less enthusiastic than
its government. News sources have reported on the Accords in a relatively
neutral way.94 They point out that the Accords are American-led, and it is NASA
that is “seek[ing] to establish a set of principles for space exploration including
lunar resource extraction.”95 Japanese media also bring up the fact that China
and Russia are not involved in this agreement.96

https://www.ansa.it/canale_scienza_tecnica/notizie/spazio_astronomia/2020/09/25/accordoitalia-usa-sullesplorazione-della-luna-_16c32da0-dadc-41dc-aeeb-20adc8b3bae4.html.
89 Doug Messier, Italy Signs Artemis Accords, PARABOLIC ARC (Oct. 16, 2020),
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2020/10/16/italy-signs-artemis-accords/.
90 Italy-USA Agreement on the Exploration of the Moon, supra note 88.
91 Id.
92 Stefano Pioppi, An Alliance for the Moon. The Geopolitical Weight of the Artemis
Accords Explained by Spagnulo, FORMICHE (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://formiche.net/2020/10/luna-geopolitica-artemis-spagnulo.
93 Eight Nations Sign Artemis Accords on Space Exploration, supra note 67.
94 See, e.g., James Hand-Cukierman and Mitsuru Obe, Space Powers Take Aim at Moon
in Quest for Resources and Glory, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (JAPAN) (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Space-powers-take-aim-at-moon-in-quest-forresources-and-glory; Govt to Agree on Intl Principles for Space, JAPAN NEWS, Oct. 13,
2020, at 1, POLITICS, File No. 25121; Keisuke Katori & Shiori Ogawa, New Legislation
Gives Companies Legal Rights to Lunar Resources, AJW (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14420386.
95 Japan Joins U.S.-Led Pact for Space Exploration and Moon Mining, JAPAN TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20210122073534/https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/10/14/national/science-health/japan-us-space-moon-mining/;
see also Pioppi, supra note 92.
96 E.g., Japan Joins U.S.-Led Pact for Space Exploration and Moon Mining, supra note
95.
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E. Luxembourg
The Luxembourg government has emphasized that the Accords will promote
peace in outer space. The Luxembourg Minister of the Economy, Franz Fayot,
said, “The Artemis Accords . . . support the peaceful exploration sustainable
utilization of space,” and97 news coverage in Luxembourg, like Italy, has
emphasized the economic advantages of international cooperation for space
exploration.98 Luxembourgers have good reason to expect an economic perk, as
Luxembourg passed the “Law of July 20th 2017 on the Exploration and Use of
Space,” which allows for space resources’ commercial usage.99 Luxembourgers
are also looking forward to having a more significant presence in space.100
F. Ukraine
Like Italy and Luxembourg, Ukraine is eager to collaborate more with the
U.S. The Ukrainian State Space Agency “hopes that the signing of the Accords
will facilitate [the] conclusion of a framework agreement on cooperation in
space exploration between the government of Ukraine and the U.S.”101 Press
there has reported on Ukraine signing the Accords agreement positively.102 The
Ukrainian public seems to share its government’s enthusiasm about working
more closely with the U.S. and furthering Ukrainian presence in space.103

97 Minister of the Economy Franz Fayot Signs the Artemis Accords on Behalf of
Luxembourg at the International Aeronautical Congress, LUXEMBOURG SPACE AGENCY
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://space-agency.public.lu/en/news-media/news/2020/20201.html.
98 See, e.g., Les Ressources Spatiales: Un Filon Prometteur pour le Luxembourg,
LUXEMBURGER WORT (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.wort.lu/fr/economie/les-ressourcesspatiales-un-filon-prometteur-pour-le-luxembourg-5c1ce5aa182b657ad3b9c37c.
99 Law of July 20th 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, LUXEMBOURG
SPACE AGENCY (Aug. 11, 2019), https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legalframework/law_space_resources_english_translation.html.
100 Les Ressources Spatiales: un Filon Prometteur Pour le Luxembourg, supra note 98;
Luxembourg, NASA Among First Signatories of Artemis Accords, CHRONICLE.LU (Oct. 14,
2020), https://chronicle.lu/category/space/34267-luxembourg-nasa-among-first-signatoriesof-artemis-agreements.
101 Messier, supra note 66.
102 Ukraine Joins NASA’s Mars and Moon Exploration Program, CTR. FOR TRANSP.
STRATEGIES (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://en.cfts.org.ua/news/ukraine_joins_nasas_mars_and_moon_exploration_program; US
Embassy Congratulates Ukraine on Joining NASA Artemis Program, KYIV POST (Nov. 17,
2020), https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/us-embassy-congratulates-ukraine-onjoining-nasa-artemis-program.html?cn-reloaded=1; Yarova, supra note 71.
103 Yarova, supra note 71; US Embassy Congratulates Ukraine on Joining NASA
Artemis Program, supra note 102.
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G. The U.A.E.
The U.A.E.’s government has spoken favorably on the Accords and its
commitment to peace. Sarah Al Amiri, the Minister of State for Advanced
Technology, said, “[a]s a peaceful space fairing nation, the U.A.E. is pleased to
become a signatory of the Artemis Accords, and our endorsement of this
agreement is in keeping with our principle of the peaceful use and exploration
of outer space.”104 The response from the U.A.E.’s public is also mainly
positive.105 Those sources that reported on the signing talked about how the
Accords align with the U.A.E.’s vision of how space should be used.106 There
is also some concern about China and Russia not being Signatories.107 Arab
News says Russia’s denouncing of the Accords “[marks] the probable end of the
type of close cooperation seen for two decades on the International Space
Station.”108
H. The United Kingdom
Like all the other signatories’ governments, the British government is
optimistic about the Accords. A press release from the United Kingdom (“U.K.”)
space agency recently supported peaceful efforts, saying, “[a]t the core of the
Artemis Accords is the requirement that all activities will be conducted for
peaceful purposes.”109 The Head of International Policy at the U.K. Space
Agency, Arfan Chaudhry, has commented on how “[the Accords] are key
principles for devising a sustainable presence on the Moon while preparing for
onward human missions to Mars.”110 Like Ukraine, the U.K. is looking forward
to collaborating more with the U.S.111 The U.K. is also keen on promoting its
current and future leadership in space. “Signing the Accords is a strong signal
of our intent to take a leading global role in civil space,” said Graham Turnock,
C.E.O. at the U.K. Space Agency.112
The British public has been critical of the lack of broader international

GULF NEWS, supra note 67.
Id.
106 Id.; KT Edit: Collaborating in Space, KHALEEJ TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/kt-edit-collaborating-in-space.
107 ARAB NEWS, supra note 66.
108 Id.
109 UK and NASA Sign International Agreement Ahead of Mission to the Moon, supra
note 67.
110 Whipple, supra note 66.
111 UK and NASA Sign International Agreement Ahead of Mission to the Moon, supra
note 67 (explaining that the extent of the United Kingdom’s expected involvement in the
Artemis Accords).
112 Id.
104
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collaboration. It is important to note that China and Russia are not going to sign
any time soon.113 The British Broad Casting Network (“B.B.C.”) states that
“some experts working in the area of international relations and space law have
also questioned whether the accords are too focused on U.S. interests, in a way
that could lead to disagreements in the far future, especially if, or when,
commercial interests overtake today’s scientific exploration.”114 The Times
stated “the Accords were signed without the endorsement of two of the nations
most likely to engage in that exploration . . . some legal experts have claimed,
risk overriding a fragile consensus governing activities in space, in an attempt
to make money from it.”115 The International Director of the U.K. Space
Agency, Dr. Alice Bunn, told the B.B.C. that the U.K. Space Agency was
hesitant to sign the Accords on account of the “safety zones.”116 However, after
clarification from the U.S. and compromise, they signed.117
I. South Korea, New Zealand, and Brazil
The governments of the newest signatories to the Accords also have positive
feelings towards their cooperation with the U.S. via the Accords.118 South
Korean newspapers have been neutral about South Korea joining—commenting
objectively on the partnership between South Korea and the U.S. and the
provisions of the Accords.119 They also bring up the fact that China and Russia
are not participating in the Accords and one mentioned that the Artemis Accords
conflict with the Moon Agreement. 120
Amos, supra note 53; see also Whipple, supra note 66.
Amos, supra note 53.
115 Whipple, supra note 66.
116 See Amos, supra note 53.
117 Id.
118 See S. Korea Signs U.S.-Led Moon Exploration Accord, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY
(May 27, 2021), https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210527001200320; see also Signing up
for Artemis Agreement, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 27, 2021),
https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=371210; see also New Zealand
Joins Artemis Accords, MINISTRY OF BUS., INNOVATION & EMP. (June 1, 2021),
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/about/news/new-zealand-joins-artemis-accords/; Brazil Joins
NASA Initiative that Will Take the First Woman to the Moon, GOVERNO FEDERAL DO BRASIL
(June 15, 2021), https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/
noticias/2021/06/brasil-adere-a-iniciativa-da-nasa-que-levara-a-primeira-mulher-a-lua.
119 See No-pil Kwak, South Korea Will Also Participate in US Lunar Exploration in
2024, HANKYOREH, https://
www.hani.co.kr/arti/science/science_general/996887.html, (last visited Mar. 23, 2022); see
also Hyun-kyung Lee, The ‘Artemis Agreement’ that South Korea Participated in at the
Korea-U.S. Summit, DONGA SCI. (May 24, 2021),
https://www.dongascience.com/news.php?idx=46767.
120 Kwak, supra note 119; see generally Lee, supra note 119.
113
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New Zealand newspapers reported favorably on the Artemis Accords.121 They
place an emphasis on the Accords’ commitment to the sustainable mining of
outer space resources.122 One newspaper reported on the economic advantages
that are expected to come from the Accords, and also provided a summary of the
objectives of the Accords.123 Another quoted Peter Beck, the founder of Rocket
Lab, that New Zealand’s signing of the Accords was “a testament to the
country’s growing role in the space industry.”124
Brazilian newspapers have been positive on the country signing the Artemis
Accords.125 They seem to be proud that Brazil is the first of the Latin American
countries to sign the Accords.126 They also emphasize the fact that the Artemis
Program is going to bring the first woman to the moon.127 One newspaper quoted
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro saying that “Brazilians are really making
history” and that the objective of the agreement between Brazil and the U.S. is
to “encourage young Brazilians to take an interest in science and demonstrate
their potential.”128
The European Space Agency (E.S.A.) seems to be neutral about the Artemis
Accords.129 E.S.A. has posted an informational page about the Accords and the
Memorandum of Understanding (which it has signed with NASA).130 The
summary looks like all the others floating about the Internet.131 On whether or
not it will sign the Accords, the head of E.S.A.’s Washington office, Sylvie
Espinasse, said the “[ESA] ‘will listen carefully’ to all its member states.”132
See Perry, supra note 14.
New Zealand and NASA Partner Up, Allowing Aotearoa to Grow Space Industry,
Minister Says, RADIO N.Z. (June 2, 2021),
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/443848/new-zealand-and-nasa-partner-up-allowingaotearoa-to-grow-space-industry-minister-says [hereinafter RADIO N.Z.]; see also Perry,
supra note 14.
123 RADIO N.Z., supra note 122.
124 Perry, supra note 14.
125 See also Secretário de Estado dos EUA Cobra Ações Ambientais Concretas do
Brasil, O GLOBO MUNDO (June 17, 2021), https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/secretario-deestado-dos-eua-cobra-acoes-ambientais-concretas-do-brasil-25066149; see generally
Cavalcante, supra note 71.
126 Cavalcante, supra note 71; Secretário de Estado dos EUA Cobra Ações Ambientais
Concretas do Brasil, supra note 125.
127 Cavalcante, supra note 71; Secretário de Estado dos EUA Cobra Ações Ambientais
Concretas do Brasil, supra note 125.
128 Cavalcante, supra note 71.
129 See generally Gateway MOU and Artemis Accords –FAQs, EUROPEAN SPACE
AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_
Robotic_Exploration/Gateway_MoU_and_Artemis_Accords_FAQs.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Jeff Foust, NASA-ESA Agreement a Milestone in Efforts to Develop Artemis
International Partnerships, SPACE NEWS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://spacenews.com/nasa-esaagreement-a-milestone-in-efforts-to-develop-artemis-international-partnerships/.
121
122

18

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.2

Though large players in E.S.A., the Germans have been silent on the Accords.133
The French, however, have not stayed silent. On the official website of the
Centre national d’études spatiales (CNES, the French space agency), Julien
Mariez, head of the legal department at CNES, wrote an analytical piece of the
Accords.134 He begins by asking the question, “Who owns the Moon and its
natural resources?”135 Mariez continues by saying that there is uncertain
intentional legal framework regarding the Moon and its resources.136 He then
brings up the U.S. Space Act of 2015, in which Congress gives U.S. citizens the
right to recover space resources.137 Mariez says the U.N. is “in a rut” on making
space agreements and coming to consensuses about how to act in space.138 He
argues that “[t]his relative paralysis and the inability to undertake a multilateral
normative initiative, which can, unfortunately, be observed over time on all the
new problems of the law of space activities, leaves the field open to national
initiatives and to a certain form of unilateralism.”139 Mariez ends the piece by
wondering if the Accords will be the end of international space law, as the
Accords are a set of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the other
signatories.140 Aforementioned, most other international space agreements, like
the Outer Space Treaty, are multilateral agreements.141
China, as one could imagine, is not thrilled about the Artemis Accords.142
Guoyu Wang, Professor and Dean of the Academy of Air, Space Policy and Law
at the Beijing Institute of Technology and a Chinese delegate to COPUOS since
2012, wrote a critical article of the Accords.143 He points out issues that the U.S.
and other signatories failed to address in the many sections of the Accords.144
Wang says that the U.S. might “imply or require” that signatories to the Accords
do not collaborate with China.145 He says that “[the Accords] will aggravate the
game of interpreting and formulating international rules of space resources
133 Susmita Mohanty, Artemis Accords: A Step Toward Space Mining and Colonization,
FRIENDS OF EUR. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/artemis-accordsa-step-toward-space-mining-and-colonisation/.
134 Julien Mariez, À qui Appartiennent la Lune et ses Ressources Naturelles?, CENTRE
NATIONAL D’ÉTUDES SPATIALES (July 15, 2020), https://cnes.fr/fr/qui-appartiennent-la-luneet-ses-ressources-naturelles.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See discussion supra Section III.a.
142 Wang, supra note 55.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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activities, and will intensify the controversies in [the] international
community.”146 Wang is also afraid that the “safety zones” could become “de
facto spheres of influence of a state or be subject to national appropriation.”147
Song Zhongping, a military and aerospace expert, has compared the Accords to
colonization and has accused the U.S. of seeking sovereignty over the Moon.148
It does not help that Congress will not allow NASA to work with China.149
Russia has the same critical view as China.150 In the past, Russia has said that
“policies that certain states have adopted outside the U.N. framework on the
exploration and use of resources in outer space . . . is fraught with serious risks
for international cooperation and understanding.”151 Sergey Savelyev, Deputy
Director General of Roscosmos (the Russian space agency), compared President
Trump’s executive order allowing recovery and use of space resources to
colonialism: “[T]here have already been examples in history when one country
decided to start seizing territories in its own interests and everyone remembers
how that turned out.”152 However critical Roscosmos officials have been of the
Artemis Program and the Accords, Director General Dmitry Rogozin has said
that Roscosmos will still make sure the docking modules of their spacecraft will
be compatible with that of NASA and the other signatories.153
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The Artemis Accords serve as a twenty-first century adaptation of the Outer
Space Treaty to current and foreseeable technologies in a particular
environment, with a focus on exploration and resource usage.154 To that end, the
authors of the Accords base them on the same principles as and affirm the
Id.
Id.
148 Azcárate Ortega, supra note 35.
149 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
112-10, § 1340(a), 125 Stat.
38, 123 (2011).
150 Azcárate Ortega, supra note 35.
151 Comment By the Information and Press Department on the US President’s Executive
Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources,
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE RUSS. FED’N (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4096701.
152 Bob Daemmrich, Russia Compares Trump’s Space Mining Order to Colonialism,
MOSCOW TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/07/russiacompares-trumps-space-mining-order-to-colonialisma69901.
153 Amos, supra note 53.
154 Walker A. Smith, Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law:
A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space, 86 J. AIR. L. & COM.
661, 668 (2021).
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importance of compliance with the Outer Space Treaty.155 The Accords work to
expound on principles found in the Outer Space Treaty and cite to the treaty as
foundational to the success of the Accords.156 However, some of the adaptations
within the Accords go beyond the scope of the Outer Space Treaty.157 This
arguably results in a new interpretation of the multilateral agreement with the
inherent risk of possibly confusing its intent and obligations. Conversely, the
Accords may serve to strengthen the Outer Space Treaty and clarify state
practice in light of new space activities.
A. How the Accords Clarify or Confuse the Outer Space Treaty
The Accords have the potential to expand on the Outer Space Treaty primarily
in Section 4, which deals with transparency and echoes Article XI of the Outer
Space Treaty.158 Article XI establishes that state parties agree to inform the
Secretary General of the UN, the public, and the international scientific
community on the “nature, conduct, locations and results” of exploration and
operations in outer space “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”159 In
Section 4 of the Accords, this transparency is to be accomplished in accordance
with the outer space treaty, but the “greatest extent feasible and practicable”
standard is exchanged for the term “good-faith basis.”160
This slight alteration in wording also appears to lower the standard for
transparency. One interpretation under the “good faith standard” could be, that
if a country does not share the nature, conduct, and locations of their activities,
then they can be seen as acting in bad faith. The “good faith” standard is more
open to legal interpretation. This interpretation can allow for future international
agreements to address specific issues, without automatically conflicting with the
Artemis Accords. By providing flexibility, the Accords can take the 1967
doctrines of the Outer Space Treaty and apply them to the twenty-first century
geopolitical landscape.
Conversely, an area where the Accords may complicate and possibly
contradict the Outer Space Treaty is regarding safety zones. As part of Section
11 of the Artemis Accords, safety zoning is intended to be a part of a larger
model to deconflict space activities between the many different nations that will
be operating in space.161 Arguably, safety zones appear to be consistent with
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
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Articles XI and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, because they will provide the
public with the location and information on general operations on the moon to
prevent harmful interference.162 On the other hand, some argue that the
establishment of specific safety zones for an extended period of time, could lead
to “de facto spheres of influence of a state or be subject to national
appropriation.”163
B. Safety Zones
Safety zones have been discussed before, specifically at the Hague Space
Resources Governance Working Group.164 Splitting from these discussions, The
Accords appear to focus on the interests of the party which establishes the zone,
rather than the balance of interests which the Hague Working Group
addressed.165 The concern hinges on the issue of permanence. If the safety zone
is permanent, then it may become a form of de facto national appropriation.166
But there is no clear definition of permanence.
When considering safety zones directly with space mining, it is clear from
human experience in mining on Earth, that the land is never fully returned to
what it once was before.167 Translating this to space resource extraction and
safety zones, what happens if there is an accident or extreme environmental
damage to the moon or other celestial body and a safety zone needs to be
established permanently for the safety of humankind? A nation may then have a
permanency issue that could be interpreted as national appropriation.
C. Heritage Sites
Another area that the Accords causes a discrepancy with the Outer Space
Treaty is possibly in preserving Outer Space Heritage.168 The confusion arises
under the same concept of national appropriation. For example, if the U.S. set

162 Hunter Sutherland, Note, The Stakes Are Out of This World: How to Fix the Space
Act of 2015, 22 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 100, 108 (2021).
163 Wang, supra note 55.
164 Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group Final Report,
UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN 16 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/
content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/
lucht—en-ruimterecht/space-resources/final-report-phase-2_the-hague-international-spaceresources-governance-working-group.pdf.
165 Wang, supra note 55.
166 Christopher Johnson, A First Look at the Artemis Accords, LINKEDIN (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/first-look-artemis-accords-christopher-johnson/.
167 Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group Final Report,
supra note 164.
168 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 9.
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an Outer Space Heritage “zone” to preserve the Apollo 11 landing site under
Section 9 of the Accords, is the U.S. therefore excluding other nations from
space activities on that same site? If so, the U.S. would be exhibiting some form
of property right on that site and could be accused of national appropriation. It
appears that the Accords are trying to avoid this appropriation issue by placing
Outer Space Heritage language in an international bilateral agreement, because
it can be argued that it is not national appropriation if other nations agree to
preserve a site, compared to just the U.S.169 Perversely, it would be primarily
U.S. technology that is being preserved as “Outer Space Heritage” and other
nations could again argue this is de facto appropriation.170 Because there is no
clear definition or established norm to clarify the issue, confusion flourishes.
The tension in seeking to save historical sites and equipment for future
generations against the free use and access of space resources is an issue that
arises again and again in space diplomacy.171
There are two unique methods that have the potential to establish these Outer
Space Heritage Zones, while minimizing accusations of national appropriation.
One alternative to countries establishing these historical preservation zones, is
to have private entities advocate and establish these sites.172 An example of this
would be a private entity with no ties to any one government, such as the
organization For All Moonkind.173 In 2018, For All Moonkind was granted the
status of Permanent Observer to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space and has made it its mission to protect each of the six human
lunar landing sites.174 The use of private entities, unaffiliated to any one country,
could allow for a much more objective approach to the establishment of
historical sites.175 However, the use of private entities could result in a disparity
in deciding what sites are preserved and which sites are not. This is because the
actions of private organizations would be limited to the scope of their operating
budgets and personal preferences of their members, rather than the national
Id.
Id. at § 1 (“The Signatories intend to preserve out space heritage, which they consider
to comprise historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft, and
other evidence of activity on celestial bodies in accordance with mutually developed
standards and practices.”).
171 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019).
172 Id.
173 Mission Statement, FOR ALL MOONKIND,
https://www.forallmoonkind.org/moonkind-mission/mission-statement/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2022) (Mission Statement: “Ensure the six Apollo Lunar Landing and similar sites in
outer space are recognized for their outstanding value to humanity and consequently
preserved and protected for posterity as part of our common human heritage.”).
174 Id.
175 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 171.
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objectives of individual countries.176
The second approach is to establish a process similar to that of the 1972 World
Heritage Convention.177 While this convention falls under UNESCO, something
similar could be established for space heritage sites.178 Another alternative
would be that the 1972 Convention is amended to include space heritage sites.
The Convention is a pledge by the signatories to conserve sites and communicate
the conservation and preservation of these sites to the international
community.179 By following a similar pattern for Space Heritage Sites, as the
1972 Convention, it follows an established international process. This lends
additional credibility to the system and could lessen the negative effects of
limiting access to these sites through the required plans and processes.
The discussion of safety zones and preservation of outer space heritage both
cut directly to property rights on the Moon, and by extension other celestial
bodies. The Outer Space Treaty is generally seen as ambiguous on how property
rights translate to space resources.180 In fact, the global definition of “space
resources” is in a constant state of evolution. Under conventional property law
concepts, it is clear that the lunar rocks from the Apollo missions are owned by
the U.S. of America.181 Russian lunar samples have passed to private individuals
for sale and resale, setting the precedent that once an object is removed from a
celestial body, it is subject to some level of ownership rights, even if the celestial
bodies themselves are not.182 The Outer Space Treaty does not exactly address
these issues. The treaty is sometimes viewed as an antiquated treaty from the
Cold War Era, when fear of appropriation for military use was the primary fear
and resource extraction was secondary.183 This confusion is compounded in the
Accords, concerning the “principle of free access to all areas of celestial bodies,”
while also working to establish certain zones.184

Id.
The World Heritage Convention, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2022) (“The most significant feature of the 1972 World Heritage
Convention is that it links together in a single document the concepts of nature conservation
and the preservation of cultural properties. The Convention recognizes the way in which
people interact with nature, and the fundamental need to preserve the balance between the
two.”).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Abigail D. Pershing, Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s Non-Appropriation
Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today, 44 YALE J. INT’L. L. 149, 169
(2019).
181 Matthew P. Hytrek, Note, Property Rights in Current Space Law: A Hinderance to
Space Exploration, 39 WHITTIER L. REV. 90, 103–04 (2018).
182 Id. at 109.
183 Id. at 92–93.
184 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 11.
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V. SPACE RESOURCE UTILIZATION: COVERAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS
Article I of the Outer Space treaty states that the exploration of space and use
of its resources are for the communal use of all nations, with Article II going
further by prohibiting any national appropriation of space and its resources.185
National appropriation cannot be done “by claim of sovereignty, by means or
use or occupation, or by any other means.”186 The treaty is largely silent on the
actions of private individuals and entities from owning regions of space, the
moon, or other celestial bodies and the utilization of their resources. As a result,
the U.S. was arguably acting within its rights to pass the 2015 Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act (2015 Act).187 This act allowed for, and even
encouraged, private ownership of space resources by U.S. citizens.188 While this
perspective remains controversial internationally, there are prominent scholars
who support it suggesting, “[t]here should be no debate over this” because of the
“numerous” examples of resource samples being “returned to Earth and owned
by the extracting nation and even sold in some cases.”189 The U.S. reinforced
this perspective when President Donald Trump signed an executive order on
April 6, 2020 encouraging American citizens to explore, harvest, and utilize
space resources.190 This Executive Order also rejected the Moon Agreement as
Customary international law, reminding the world that the U.S. was not a
signatory to that Agreement.191
The Artemis Accords do not directly reference the 2015 Act or 2020
Executive Order. However, the legal interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty
and perspective on space resources appear synonymous between the three
documents.192 Even though U.S. perspectives and interpretations appear to be in
sync between the three documents, signatories to the Artemis Accords are not
instantly signaling support of U.S. legislation and space policy by signing the
accords. Each nation has their own perspective on the Accords and use of Space
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 57, at art. 1–2.
Id. at art. 2.
187 Camisha L. Simmons, On the Edge: Space Exploration and Production: Bankruptcy
Perspectives, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2020).
188 Id.
189 Matthew Schaefer, Property Rights in Space (Part II): Post New Space Conference
Thoughts - Posey ASTEROIDS Act, Bigelow Payload Safety Review, On-Orbit Jurisdiction,
Etc., LAWOFSCHAEFER (July 26, 2014), https://lawofschaefer.com/2014/07/26/propertyrightsin-space-part-ii-post-newspace-conference-thoughts-posey-asteroids-actbigelowpayload-safety-review-on-orbit-jurisdiction-etc/.
190 Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20, 381 (Apr. 10, 2020).
191 Id.
192 Id.; Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 10; Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015, 51 U.S.C. § 51302 (2020).
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Resources, which all vary slightly from the U.S. perspective.193
It is an established view that signing a treaty with one country does not
indicate the country’s support of all legislation from that other country. Thus,
the signing of the Artemis Accords does not directly indicate that a country
supports the U.S. 2015 Commercial Space Launch or President Trump’s April
2020 Executive Order establishing entitlements to U.S. companies of space
resources. However, in this instance it could be argued that by signing the
Artemis Accords, which were primarily drafted by a U.S. government entity,
that the signatories would be indicating support for a U.S. centric perspective on
outer space and the utilization of space resources.
Support for U.S. remise would include the legal interpretation of national
appropriation. Under Section 10 of the Artemis Accords, extraction and
utilization of space resources is not only permissible but encouraged.194
Interestingly, the Accords state that these actions should comply with the Outer
Space Treaty.195 The key sentence of Section 10 is: “[t]he Signatories affirm that
the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national
appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, and that contracts and
other legal instruments relating to space resources should be consistent with that
Treaty.”196 This sentence is important because it establishes the basis for space
resource utilization. One legal interpretation of Articles I and II of the Outer
Space Treaty is that any use of space resources could be considered national
appropriation. This sentence from Section 10 of the Accords establishes a
specific legal perspective, to which the Signatories are prescribing.197 Signatory
nations to the Accords are stating that they support the legal interpretation that
the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national
appropriation.198 This means that simply taking a resource from space or a
celestial body is not in itself national appropriation. The accords thus imply that
national appropriation of space resources is a multi-step process, to which
extraction is simply one part.
In addition, international opinions of the Artemis Accords are mixed,
signaling that the Accords themselves may be viewed as too U.S. centric in
promoting the privatization of space resources.199 These opinions could result in
a weakening of the Accords or even the Outer Space Treaty itself. As more
See supra Sections IV.a–IV.i.
Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 10.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See id.
198 Id. at § 10, ¶ 2.
199 Andrew Jones, Russian Space Chief Disses NASA’s Artemis Moon Landing Plans,
SPACE.COM (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.space.com/russia-space-agency-chief-criticizesnasa-moon-plans.
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countries sign the Accords, it could be perceived as a shift to a U.S. legal
interpretation of the outer space treaty, which could deter future cooperation or
result in competing agreements that support a more liberal interpretation of the
Outer Space Treaty.
So, while signatories to the Artemis Accords are not necessarily indicating
their country’s support of the U.S. 2015 Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act and Trump’s April 2020 Executive Order, they may be
indicating their support for a specific legal interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty, that allows for the extraction and utilization of space resources.
VI. THE MOON AGREEMENT: COVERAGE AND CONCERNS
The Artemis Accords contradict the 1979 Moon Agreement, to which the U.S.
is not a party, in several places.200 As the Moon Agreement is recognized by
some countries as Customary International Law, it is important to consider how
countries will address apparent conflicts between competing space treaties and
doctrines.
A. Background and the U.S.
Currently, only 18 countries have ratified the Moon Agreement.201 Notably,
Russia, China, and the U.S. have all decided not to ratify the Agreement.202 The
U.S. has noted that the differences between the Moon Agreement and the Outer
Space Treaty contribute to uncertainty regarding the rights to extract and utilize
space resources.203 The U.S. also believes that Americans have the right to
engage in commercial exploration, extraction, and utilization of space resources,
in accordance with applicable law.204 The U.S. argues that “[o]uter space is a
legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the U.S. does not
view it as a global commons.”205 As a result of this view, the U.S., through the
Secretary of State, will object to any attempt to treat the Moon Agreement as
“reflecting or otherwise expressing customary international law.”206
Even though the U.S. does not recognize the Moon Agreement as customary

200 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Agreement), Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
201 Id.
202 See generally id.
203 51 U.S.C.S. § 51302 (2021).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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international law, there are countries that do.207 If these countries want to join
the Artemis Accords, or any agreement the supports the recovery and use of
space resources from the moon, then they will have to reconcile the two
conflicting agreements. As Australia is currently the only country in this
predicament, many eyes will be on how Australia handles this apparent conflict
in international agreements.208
B. Specific Conflicts Between the Moon Treaty and the Artemis Accords
There are several instances where sections of the Artemis Accords directly
conflict with the Moon Agreement. Section 10 is one of several places where the
Artemis Accords breakaway from the text of the 1979 Moon Treaty. In Section
10 of the Accords signatories affirm the ability to extract space resources from
the Moon.209 As part of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, the Moon is the
common heritage of humankind and if there is to be space resource extraction,
it will be accomplished through the establishment of an international regime that
will govern the extraction.210 Both of these concepts are missing from the
Artemis Accords. 211
Another conflict between the Moon Agreement and the Artemis Accords
occurs in the establishment of Common Heritage Sites and Safety Zones. Both
of these concepts allude to a prolonged or indefinite occupation of the lunar
surface and around equipment on the Moon.212 The Moon treaty specifically
states that “[t]he placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities,
stations and installations on or below the surface of the Moon . . . shall not create
a right of ownership over the surface or subsurface of the Moon or any areas
thereof.”213 The Artemis Accords intend to “preserve artifacts, spacecraft, and
other evidence of activity on celestial bodies.”214 These conflicts present a
challenge to Australia, and any other countries who have ratified the Moon
Agreement, when they become signatories to the Artemis Accords.
It is widely accepted that simply signing an agreement, does not usually mean
207 Moon Agreement, supra note 200 (including France, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia
among others as signatories).
208 See generally id. (noting Australia as a signatory); Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at
§ 10 (noting Australia as a signatory).
209 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 10.
210 Moon Agreement, supra note 200, at art. 11.
211 See generally Jack Wright Nelson, The Artemis Accords and the Future of
International Space Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-internationalspace-law#_edn18.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at § 1.

28

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.2

that you have immediately acted contrary to another international obligation.215
However, this means that countries in situations like Australia’s will need to
routinely review their commitments to these two agreements to ensure that there
is no conflict otherwise, Australia may need to withdraw from one of them.216
After signing the Accords, Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head of the Australian
Space Agency, stated:
The Australian Government is investing $150 million for Australian
businesses and researchers to join NASA’s endeavour, and
investment here in Australia, and deliver key capabilities for
missions through participation in international space supply chains.
Given Australia’s capabilities in space communications, robotics and
automation, Earth observation, space medicine as well as capabilities
in the resources sector, Australia is ready to contribute its best ideas
and know-how to support the future of space exploration.217
What is most notable about this statement is its silence to the apparent conflict
between the Moon Agreement and the Artemis Accords.218 In fact, the statement
highlights actions that Australia can take which are technically in accordance
with both documents. Further, NASA administrator, Jim Bridenstine, has been
quoted as stating that Australia has experience in autonomous capability of
extracting resources from its mining industry and this capability will be very
important to lunar mining.219
In its current form, Australia does not appear to be denouncing the 1979 Moon
Agreement by signing the Artemis Accords however, they are also not openly
committing to anything which would directly violate the Moon Agreement.220
Although they have signed the Accords, they have not explicitly stated their
support of the utilization of space resources by private entities either. It is also
important to note, that in this instance, the Accords are silent on actively stating
that the extraction of space resources will definitely occur.221 Rather, it presents
a negative, that extracting space resources does not inherently constitute national

Nelson, supra note 211.
Id.
217 Australia Signs NASA’s Artemis Accords, DEP’T OF INDUSTRY, SCI., ENERGY AND RES.
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-signs-nasas-artemis-accords.
218 Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 200, with Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at
§ 1.
219 Jeffery McGee & Bin Li, Australia Has Long Valued an Outer Space Shared By All.
Mining Profits Could Change All This, THECONVERSATION.COM (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/australia-has-long-valued-an-outer-space-shared-by-all-miningprofits-could-change-this-137405.
220 Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 200, with Artemis Accords, supra note 25, at
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appropriations.222 The interpretation that this means extraction of resources will
occur is implied rather than explicit. This allows countries like Australia to toe
the line by saying that they can support both the Moon Agreement and the
Artemis Accords, because while the Moon Agreement directly forbids resources
extraction, the Accords do not actively state extraction will occur.
VII. GLOBAL IMPACT: IN CONCLUSION
Based on the global responses, the desired effect of the Artemis Accords could
be achieved. Focusing on the Accords’ altruistic intentions of creating
international standards of conducting activities in space to ensure the safety and
sustainability of space, they will only be achieved if enough countries sign into
the Accords. If more countries sign bilateral agreements with the U.S., then the
Accords will become the global standard, whether other countries or
international bodies want it to or not. In terms of the “problematic” intents of the
extraction and utilization of space resources and “safety zones,” they also might
also be achieved. Like the altruistic intents, if enough countries become
signatories, then the Accords’ standard will rule the cosmos. The only thing
stopping this from happening is the fact that Sections 10 and 11 of the Accords
have the potential to go against Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty.223
Presumably, there will be consequences against countries that violate the Treaty.
If those consequences can deter countries from extracting and utilizing space
resources, then that desired effect of the Accords will not be achieved.
It has yet to be seen whether the Artemis Accords have worked in the U.S.’s
best interests. The Accords are certainly one potential way for the U.S. to secure
its leadership in space. If the U.S. can get enough countries to become
signatories, especially countries like France, Germany, and Russia, then they
will have a power majority, confirming U.S. leadership. The issue is that many
countries are still skeptical of the Accords. To help quiet fears from the broader
international community, the U.S. and other signatories could invoke Section 13
of the Accords to hold a meeting to reevaluate the Accords’ text and possible
consequences.224
In 2008, the European Union attempted to create a set of rules, the Draft
International Code of Conduct, with the same aim peaceful, constructive aims
of the Accords.225 Not enough countries signed, however, so it failed.226 To
See generally id. at § 10.
Compare id. at §§ 10-11, with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 57, at art. 2.
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survive, an international agreement needs to be more than a couple of likeminded allies coming together. If the U.S. is not careful, the Accords could go
the way of the Draft International Code of Conduct.
The Artemis Accords might make space activities more secure and safe. The
safety zones of Section 11 of the Artemis Accords are a relatively good idea in
theory.227 There will inevitably be an operation that needs to be isolated for fear
it will harm or be harmed by another. As long as the “safety zones” are not
abused, they will most likely make space activities safer.
Another difficulty is the extraction and utilization of space resources. As
mentioned before, policy experts and scientists have already expressed their
anxieties over this.228 Earth is a prime example of what happens when
regulations regarding resources are ignored. Section 10 of the Accords could be
abused, and space resources may be depleted quickly.229 It is up to the U.S., as
the leader of the Accords, to make sure signatories comply with Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty.
The Artemis Accords have begun to create a significant shift in how space
diplomacy may be conducted in the future. All of the successful international
agreements on space have been multilateral and drawn up in an international
forum. The Accords, however, are a set of bilateral agreements with the U.S. as
the leader. If they are successful, the Accords will be a good example of creating
a set of bilateral agreements for other countries who wish to get around the
tediousness of creating multilateral agreements. The most recent space treaty out
of the COPUOS was the Moon Agreement of 1979, which was not signed by the
U.S. or any other space power of the time. The Accords might be a sign that the
international community needs to come together to make multilateral
agreements in a way in which all countries can be heard.
There is the potential that the Accords will set a precedent of like-minded
countries signing agreements to work together and cutting the rest of the world
out. This will most likely be counterproductive. If space-faring countries do not
acknowledge one another, then there is predictably going to be conflict, which
will take focus away from scientific and humanitarian advancement.
It has been less than a year since the founding member states signed the
Artemis Accords, and the Artemis Program will not land astronauts on the moon
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until later this decade.230 The journey of the Accords has just begun. For now,
there can only be speculation on their success, failure, and consequences.

230 Chelsea Gohd, NASA’s Artemis Astronauts Won’t Land On the Moon By 2024
Deadline, SPACE.COM (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.space.com/nasa-changes-artemis-moonlanding-goal-2024.
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